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TIE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOUISIANA AID TO
PRIVATE EDUCATION
Introduction
Many states have enacted statutes designed to partially relieve the heavy
financial burden carried by parents who choose to educate their children
in private schools. Because many of these schools are religiously affiliated,
these statutes have frequently been attacked as violating the Establish-
ment Clause of the first amendment.' Some of these statutes have sur-
vived this attack, but many have not. This note will briefly review the
standards applied by the United States Supreme Court in deciding the
constitutionality of state aid to pre-college private education, and will then
consider in light of these standards the constitutionality of several current
Louisiana statutes which directly or indirectly aid pre-college private
education. 2
Standards Applied by the United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court held long ago that Congress could
provide grants to a religious organization to perform a wholly secular
function without violating the Establishment Clause,' but such govern-
ment assistance has been subject to rigorous scrutiny in recent decisions.
The first of the modern cases in this area was Everson v. Board of
Education," a decision which narrowly (five to four) upheld a New Jersey
statute authorizing local school districts to provide transportation for school
children, including transportation to and from nonprofit, nonpublic
schools. Justice Black's majority opinion concluded:
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions ....
• . . New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment
of religion" clause . . . contribute tax-raised funds to the sup-
port of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any
church. On the other hand, other language of the amendment
commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude
individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews,
Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation.'
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
2. The author is an officer and trustee of The Runnels Schools, Inc., a nonprofit,
nonsectarian, nondiscriminatory educational institution located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
3. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
4. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. Id. at 16.
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Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, first
stated the three-part test the Court has since followed in examining laws
claimed to violate the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "'
As a practical matter, a valid secular legislative purpose is virtually always
found, so discussions focus on "effect" and "entanglement." The Court
has upheld state programs aiding private education which loaned
textbooks,' provided transportation, 9 reimbursed expenses for testing and
reporting required by state law,'" provided certain diagnostic and
therapeutic services," and granted certain forms of income tax relief.' 2
It has invalidated programs paying all or part of teachers' salaries,' 3 reim-
bursing expenses for routine tests written by teachers,"1 providing grants
for the maintenance of school facilities,'" giving partial tuition grants to
low-income families," loaning instructional materials other than
textbooks,' 7 providing certain counseling and remedial services,'" providing
transportation for field trips,'" and granting other forms of income tax
relief.20 These decisions will be discussed in greater detail in connection
with the relevant Louisiana statutes.
As a general rule, public assistance to private elementary and second-
ary schools has been subject to stricter scrutiny than assistance to private
colleges and universities. 2' This discussion will address only direct and
indirect assistance to private education at the pre-college level. Note should
6. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
7. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970)).
8. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
9. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980);
cf. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
11. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); cf. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
12. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983); cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
13. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
14. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); cf.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
15. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
16. Id.; see also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
17. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
18. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); cf. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
19. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
20. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
cf. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
21. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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also be taken at this point of Norwood v. Harrison,22 which held a
Mississippi program loaning textbooks to students in both public and
private schools violative of the fourteenth amendment23 because the books
were lent without regard to whether the schools involved engaged in racially
discriminatory practices. The suit was remanded to allow participation
only by those schools found not to be racially discriminatory. In the re-
mainder of this article, it is assumed that the Louisiana statutes discussed
will be interpreted to allow direct or indirect benefits only to those schools
which do not discriminate racially, even where the statutes themselves do
not directly address the question.2 '
Louisiana Statutes Aiding Private Education
Transportation
Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:157-:158 provide for free transporta-
tion to all school children via buses, common carriers, and ferries. Subsec-
tion 158(F) expressly states that such transportation is intended to benefit
students in public schools and in nonpublic schools which do not
discriminate racially. This is the type of legislation upheld in Everson.
There is a potential problem, however, in subsection 158(C), which says
that if providing transportation directly is not economically feasible, the
Department of Education shall reimburse the parent or tutor of any student
living more than one mile from the school attended $125 per student
per year, not to exceed $375 per family per year. Reimbursing parents
for the actual costs incurred in transportation is entirely permissible; in
fact, this was approved in Everson itself. The problem lies in the fact
that the amount of reimbursement here does not depend upon the ex-
penses actually incurred; to the extent that this $125 per child exceeds
the actual transportation expenses for a child attending a sectarian school,
there would be a positive incentive to send one's children to such a school,
violating the Establishment Clause. 5 For example, assume that a given
family has three children in the same school, that a parent makes two
one-mile trips per day from home to school in an automobile, that there
are 180 days in the school year, and that costs are twenty cents per mile.
This family would incur transportation expenses of $144 per year; under
the statute, however, the family could be "reimbursed" $375 per year.
22. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
23. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
24. Thus, the history of Louisiana's attempts to provide direct and indirect assistance
to racially discriminatory private schools established to escape the effects of public school
desegregation is not discussed here. See, e.g., Graham v. Evangeline Parish School Bd.,
484 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); Brumfield v. Dodd, 405
F. Supp. 338 (E.D. La. 1975); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 296 F.
Supp 686 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 393 U.S. 17 (1968).
25. See infra text accompanying note 49.
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This problem could be remedied by amending the statute to allow reim-
bursement for actual transportation expenses or $125 per child, whichever
is less. Where it is not possible to prove actual expenses, some reasonable
estimate should be acceptable, such as the 20.5 cents per mile allowed
by the Internal Revenue Service as a deductible business expense.26
Textbooks and Instructional Materials
In 1974, Louisiana's program of providing free school books and other
materials of instruction to dl children in elementary and secondary schools
was made part of the new constitution.2" Louisiana Revised Statutes
17:351-:352 direct the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion to adopt, approve, and supply textbooks and other materials of in-
struction to the school children of the state.28
The ancestor of section 351, Huey Long's "Free Text Book Act," 2 9
was upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Borden v. Louisiana State
Board of Education 3 and a companion case, Cochran v. Louisiana State
Board of Education." Borden, a four to three decision written by Justice
Overton, sustained the Act under challenges based upon both the federal
and state constitutions, including challenges based on article IV, section
8 and article XII, section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. Arti-
cle IV, section 8 stated that no "money shall ever be taken from the
public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church . . . . No
appropriation from the State treasury shall be made for private . . . pur-
poses to any person .... " Article XII, section 13 provided that no
"appropriation of public funds shall be made to any private or sectarian
school." 3 The court found that the children, not the schools, were the
beneficaries of this program. Due process was not violated since the tax
money involved was to be spent legally for a public purpose. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed Cochran,33 considering only the federal
due process issue. The court found a valid public purpose in the Act,
and therefore concluded that there was no "taking of private property
for a private purpose.""
26. Rev. Proc. 83-74, 1983-41 I.R.B. 16.
27. LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13(A).
28. See also LA. R.S. 17:7(4), :8(A) (1982).
29. 1928 La. Acts, No. 100.
30. 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).
31. 168 La. 1030, 123 So. 664 (1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
32. These sections have no counterpart in the 1974 constitution. It has been said that
the "sections omitted ... may not be necessary because of the application of the first
amendment to the states and because of the increased Supreme Court activity in state education
matters." Sachse, Article VIII: Does It Change the Status Quo?, 21 Loy. L. REv. 123,
124 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
33. 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930).




Justice White's majority opinion in Board of Education v. Allen3"
upheld a New York textbook loan program to students in public or private
schools. If the textbooks loaned to students in private schools were not
those used in the public schools, they had to be approved by the local
boards of education. The Supreme Court found that the New York law
had a secular legislative purpose, and had a primary effect neither
advancing nor inhibiting religion. Absent evidence to the contrary, the
Court would not assume that the religious and secular aspects of a religious
school's instruction were so intertwined that the textbooks would be used
to further the teaching of religion. Allen 'vas followed in Meek v.
Pittenger 6 and Wolman v. Walter,3" which also upheld textbook loan pro-
grams. Both of these decisions held the loan of other instructional
materials, such as periodicals and maps, unconstitutional, whether the loans
were made to the students and their parents or directly to the schools.
In both cases, the court found that such loans were in fact made directly
to the schools, many of which provided an "integrated secular and religious
education;" 38 the loans therefore had a primary effect of advancing
religion. While this distinction between textbooks and other instructional
materials does not seem entirely logical, it does represent the current state
of constitutional doctrine.
Thus Louisiana's textbook loan program rests on firm ground, but
loaning other instructional materials to sectarian schools or their students
would likely be held unconstitutional. In 1982-1983, the per pupil
allotments under these statutes were $14.05 for textbooks, $3.90 for library
books, and $2.10 for school supplies 3 9-the last two items would
presumably be considered "other instructional materials." These amounts
are the same for students in both public and private schools.
School Lunches
There are no Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of
government assistance to school lunch programs at private schools.
However, it seems that subsidizing school lunches is even less likely to
advance religion or to require excessive government entanglement than
other forms of aid the Court has approved. As Chief Justice Burger com-
mented in Lemon v. Kurtzman: "Our decisions . . . have permitted the
States to provide church-related schools with secular, neutral, or
nonideological services, facilities, or materials. Bus transportation, school
lunches, public health services, and secular textbooks supplied in com-
35. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
36. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
37. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
38. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975).
39. 2 State of Louisiana Executive Budget Program 19-247 (1983-1984). "School sup-
plies" includes items such as pencils.
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mon to all students were not thought to offend the Establishment
Clause." °4 Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:191-:199 implement a state school
lunch program which is partially subsidized by the state and the federal
governments. The governor's proposed budget for this year notes that
last year the "[sitate funds provided for the Child Nutrition Programs
[were] (.09) nine cents per lunch, served in public and non-public
schools."'
' l
Reimbursement of Required Costs
Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:361-:365 allow the state to reimburse
nonpublic schools for actual costs incurred in providing services, main-
taining records, and filing reports required by state law or local school
boards. Such costs include those for records or reports of attendance,
school evaluation, student health, transportation, textbooks, and student
progress. Separate accounting for this reimbursement is required, and this
accounting is subject to audit. This program is virtually indistinguishable
from the New York statute upheld in the five to four decision in Com-
mittee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan."2 In Regan,
the reports were characterized as "ministerial," and the Court found that
they could not be used for religious purposes. In fact, the district court
had found that between eighty-five and ninety-five percent of the reim-
bursements involved would be for attendance reporting. Since separate
books were required for the reimbursement, auditing would not constitute
excessive entanglement, especially since the services involved were routine
and the amounts claimed could be easily compared with those from the
records of hundreds of public schools.
Louisiana Secular Educational Services Law
The Louisiana Secular Educational Services Law43 was held unconstitu-
tional by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Seegers v. Parker;44 yet, it has
never been repealed. This Act attempted to allow the state to "contract"
with teachers in private schools for the teaching of secular subjects. Justice
Barham's four to three opinion held the Act to be contrary to the state
constitution of 1921, particularly article XII, section U." Were Seegers
to arise today, after the adoption of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
the result would not differ; the statute would be invalid under the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution. Thus,
40. 403 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1971) (emphasis added).
41. 2 STATE OF LOUISIANA EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROGRAM 19-226 (1983-1984).
42. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
43. LA. R.S. 17:1321-:1325 (1982).
44. 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
45. Supra text accompanying note 32.
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the question of "reinstatement" of these statutes under the 1974 constitu-
tion need not be considered. These statutes are virtually indistinguishable
from a Pennsylvania statute held unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman."' In Lemon, Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion stated that the degree of state involvement which would
be necessary to assure that even well-meaning teachers did not incorporate
any religious precepts into their teaching and to do the accounting necessary
to separate secular from sectarian expenses would be too great under both
the Pennsylvania statute and a somewhat similar Rhode Island statute,
and would constitute excessive entanglement of government with religion.
Elementary and Secondary Education Tuition Credit and Equal
Opportunity Education Assistance Act
The Equal Opportunity Education Assistance Act"7 provided partial
tuition grants to low-income parents with children in nonprofit, nonpublic
schools. Companion legislation, the Elementary and Secondary Education
Tuition Credit,"8 allowed a tuition tax credit of up to $50 on state in-
come tax for low and middle-income taxpayers with dependants in non-
profit, nonpublic schools. These two statutory programs were very similar
to a New York tuition grant and a tuition tax benefit struck down in
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.' 9 Justice
Powell's majority opinion in Nyquist said that the incentive given parents
by the tuition grant program to send their children to sectarian schools,
regardless of the label attached to the incentive, violated the Establish-
ment Clause. Everson and Allen were distinguished in that the statutes
therein took a neutral posture toward religion; here there were no restric-
tions on how the money was to be spent, and therefore no guarantee
that religious and secular education would be kept separate. Also, Ever-
son and Allen dealt with benefits available to all school children, not just
to those in private schools. The tax benefit involved in Nyquist was
something of a hybrid between a tax credit and a tax deduction. The
Court said that the constitutionality of such a plan did not depend upon
the label given to the benefit. The Court found no significant difference
between this program and the tuition grant program: both had the primary
effect of advancing religion.
Both the Equal Opportunity Education Assistance Act and the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Tuition Credit Act were held unconstitu-
tional by the federal District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
46. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Also note that the United States Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari in Seegers v. Parker the same day the opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman was announced.
47. LA. R.S. 17:2990.1-.6 (1982).
48. LA. R.S. 47:85-:89 (Supp. 1983).
49. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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in Seegers v. Traigle,1° a decision following the recent opinion in Nyquist.
Neither law has since been repealed by the Louisiana legislature, however,
and because this decision does not appear in West's National Reporter
System, a researcher might reasonably conclude that these statutes are
still in effect.
Education Tax Credit
The most difficult constitutional question is presented by the current
education tax credit, Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:297(D). This statute
allows a credit on state income tax for actual educational expenses in-
curred, up to $25 per year per dependent child in kindergarten through
twelfth grade, regardless of whether the child attends a public or a private
school. Whether this credit is more like the tax benefit invalidated in
Nyquist or that approved in Mueller v. Allen"' is not immediately ob-
vious, but it is suggested that the rationale of Mueller should be extended
to hold this statute constitutional.
Mueller v. Allen, decided during the past term of the Supreme Court,
upheld a Minnesota state income tax deduction similar in some respects
to the New York statute held unconstitutional in Nyquist. The Minnesota
statute allowed deductions from gross income of up to $500 for dependents
in grades kindergarten to six and up to $700 for dependents in grades
seven to twelve for actual educational expenses incurred, regardless of
whether the students attended public or private schools. Deductible
expenses were found to include those for tuition (including tuition charg-
ed for some special services in public schools); secular textbooks; transpor-
tation; gym clothing; materials for home economics, shop classes, and
art classes; pencils; and notebooks. Justice Rehnquist's five to four
majority opinion urged two reasons why this statute should be distinguished
from that in Nyquist. First, the deduction involved here was part of a
broader scheme of tax deductions allowed by state law, rather than a
hybrid tax benefit akin to a tax credit, as had been the case in Nyquist."
But as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opinion, Nyquist
itself recognized that this was a distinction of dubious constitutional
significance." The second basis for distinction was the sounder one-that
"[u]nlike the assistance at issue in Nyquist, [the Minnesota statute] per-
mits all parents-whether their children attend public school or private-to
deduct their children's educational expenses.""' The resulting attenuated
50. LA. TAX Cr. REP. (CCH) 200-471 (M.D. La. Dec. 27, 1973); LA. TAX CT. REP.
(CCH) 200-472 (M.D. La. Jan. 7, 1974) (addendum to original opinion).
51. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
52. Id. at 3067.
53. Id. at 3075-76 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
54. Id. at 3068-69.
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benefits to parochial schools were held not to have the primary effect
of advancing religion. The only potential source of entanglement the Court
saw was that state officials would have to determine which textbooks would
not qualify for the deduction because they included some form of religious
instruction." Since similar decisions had to be made in textbook loan pro-
grams the Court had already approved, however, excessive entanglement
was not seen to be a danger here. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion
emphasized that, as a practical matter, the bulk of the tax benefits in-
volved would flow to parents whose children attended parochial schools,
thereby violating the "effect" test.56
The Louisiana tax benefit does take the form of a tax credit rather
than a deduction, but as pointed out in Nyquist, this is a distinction of
questionable significance. However, the other ground given in Mueller for
distinguishing Nyquist-that the benefits under the Minnesota statute are
available to parents with children in public or private schools-applies
to the Louisiana tax credit, and there is an additional feature that
distinguishes the Louisiana credit from the Minnesota deduction: Because
of the different natures of a tax credit and a tax deduction, only $25
in educational expenses need be shown in order to obtain the full benefit
of the Louisiana law, as opposed to the $500 or $700 required to be shown
under the Minnesota law. Thus the Louisiana tax benefits are truly
available to virtually all taxpayers with dependents in elementary or second-
ary schools, and will not flow primarily to parents with children attending
parochial schools. Under the Minnesota statute, the tax deduction pro-
vided would, as a practical matter, have primarily benefited those parents
with children in private or parochial schools, a practical result that was
the basis for one of the main objections voiced by Justice Marshall in
his dissent in Mueller." Furthermore, the Louisiana statute provides no
incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools since the
parents of public school children receive the same benefits as parents of
students in private schools; such an incentive was the principal reason
given in Nyquist for holding the tuition grant and tax credit at issue there
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.
Conclusion
In summary, Louisiana statutes providing benefits to nonpublic schools
and their students in the form of transportation, textbooks, school lunches,
and reimbursement for state-required costs are apparently constitutional,
although one aspect of the statute providing reimbursement for transpor-
55. Id. at 3071.
56. Id. at 3075 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
57. Id.
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tation expenses might have to be amended slightly in order to be con-
stitutional as applied to sectarian schools. Under recent United States
Supreme Court decisions, providing instructional materials other than text-
books to sectarian schools or their students is unconstitutional. The con-
stitutionality of Louisiana's education tax credit is debatable. It is sub-
mitted, however, that were the United. States Supreme Court to decide
the issue today, it would hold this credit to be constitutional, possibly
by a greater majority than that in the recent decision of Mueller v. Allen.
John H. Runnels
